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[ feel it would be a grave error to follow the formula estab-
lished by the majority. Such a formula is not consistent 
with the Dinuba case nor with the best interests of the genp.ral 
public . 
. Plaintiff and appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied 
February 17, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22570. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1954.1 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN 
COUNTIES GAS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a 
Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Franchises-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Gross 
receipts of gas company which was granted franchise by county 
to lay its pipes in public roads and highways arise from all 
of its operative property, whether or not such property is 
located on rights of way, public or private, or on land owned 
or leased by it or on land owned by others. 
[2] Id.-Oharges and Percentages - Operative Property.-Oper-
ative property of gas company which was granted franchise 
by county to lay its pipes in public roads and highways con· 
sists of various kinds of real and personal property, including 
land leased or owned, compressor stations and equipment, 
meter stations and equipment, gas production equipment, pipe 
lines, valves, general office buildings, warehouses, transporta-
tion equipment, laboratory eqnipment, etc. 
[3] Id.-Oharges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-
Since the 2 per cent charge due county for franchise granted 
gas company by county ordinance pursuant to the Broughton 
Act (Stats. 1905, p. 777; now Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6001-6071) 
applies only to gross receipts arising from use of franchise, 
gross receipts arising from operative property other than fran-
chise must be excluded from base to which the 2 per cent 
charge applies. 
[4] Id.-Oharges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Since every 
dollar invested in operative property of franchise holder earns 
an equal part of gross receipts, such receipts are attributable 
to a particular item or class of operative property according to 
[1) See Ca1.Jur. lO·Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Franchises, § 14a. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Franchises, § 2L 
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dollars invested in it, and factors in proration must be meas-
ured in same terms; since gross receipts are measured in 
dollars, the property giving rise to them must be measured in. 
dollars. 
[5] ld.-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Gross receipts 
that arise from use of franchises are gross receipts attributable 
to that part of property using public rights of way pursuant 
to franchises. 
[6] ld.-Oharges and Percentages-Gross Receip~Apportion­
ment.--Gross receipts of gas company attributable to various 
rights of way may be apportioned between public and private 
rights of way according to mileage, not necessarily as an ex-
clusive method, but as a practicable one, where county which 
granted the franchise for public rights of way does not ques-
tion this method of apportionment and adopts it in its own 
computations. 
[7] ld.-Oharges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-In 
computing base for 2 per cent charge due county for fran-
chises granted gas company to lay its pipes in public roads 
and highways, deductions must be made for gross receipts 
attributed to its office and other general facilities, part of 
its distribution system on private property owned by con-
sumers and not under lease by company, and part of its dis-
tribution system on private property owned or leased by com-
pany, since failure to make such deductions would repudiate 
principle that company's gross receipts arise from all of its 
operative property and that gross receipts from all operative 
property other than franchises must be excluded from base 
on which 2 per cent charge is computed. 
[8] ld.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-
Principle that county is not entitled to any part of gross re-
ceipts from utility property not subject to franchise charges is 
applicable to all operative property of utility not subject to 
such charges, and is not restricted to its generating plants or 
other producing agencies. 
[9] ld.-Oharges and Percentages-Property Affected.-Operative 
property (such as office buildings and warehouses) other than 
generating plants, powerhouses, and distributing system con-
sisting of poles and wires, are just as much an integral part 
of an electric or gas system as generating plants, powerhouses 
and private rights of way, and if it is absurd to say that any 
integral part of such a system is entitled to credit for whole 
of its gross receipts, it is equally absurd to say that any 
number less than the whole is so entitled. 
[10] ld.-Oharges and Percentages-Property Affected.-If an of 
property other than generating plants and powerhouses could 
reasonably be regarded as entirely part of utility's distribution 
&)'stem, it "OUlG DOt follow that gress receipts ~b.W-
) 
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- thereto should be included in fund to which 2 per cent charge 
for use of franchise applies, since gross receipts from parts of 
distribution system that are not subject to franchise charges 
are not subject to 2 per cent charge. 
[11] Id.-Charges and Percentages-Property Excluded.-Gross 
receipts attributable to private rights and gross receipts at-
tributable to private property not located on rights of way 
are separately excluded from base to which 2 per cent fran-
chise charge applies, because they arise from property not 
lubject to franchise charges, and such exclusions do not con-
stitute double deduction for same purpose. 
[12] Id.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-
By its express terms the Broughton Aet ru.lows atility to retain 
100 per cent of its gross receipts from its private property 
not subject to franchise charges ss well A8 98 per cent of 
its gross receipts arising from use of fl'Rnchises; it is not 
2 per cent of its gross receipts ~ut only 2 per cent of its 
gross receipts "arising from the use"of franchises that is 
exacted as payment f01" use of such fraaehises. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LOs 
Angeles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief and an accounting. Judg-
ment for defendant affirmed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, A. Curtis Smith and 
Gerald G. Kelly, Assistant County Counsel, and John H. 
Larson, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellant. 
LeRoy M. Edwards, Oscar C. Sattinger and Frank P. 
Doherty for Respondent. 
Louis W. :Myers and 0 'Melveny & Myers, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal involves the same basic pro}t,. 
lems as those presented in City of San Diego v. Souther'll 
Calif. Tel. Corp., ante, p. 110 [266 P.2d 14]. 
Defendant is a public utility engaged in purchs.sing and 
selling illuminating gas. It produces a small amount of the 
gas it sells. Its system is an integrated one 8.nd extends 
through six counties, including the County of Los Angeles. 
It holds franchises granted by these counties and many cities 
therein. By this action for d?c!al'atory relief and an account-
ing, plaintiff seeks a judgment establishin, the basis on which 
) 
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defendant must compute the amount due for four franchises 
grant.ed it by plaintiff to lay its pipes in the public roads, 
streets, and highways in the county Each franchise was 
granted by a separate ordinance pursuant to tht" Broughton 
Act. (Stats. 1905, p. 777, now Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6001-6071.) 
Section 8 of that act fixes the amount that must be paid for 
the franchises at "tWo per cent (2%) of the gross annual 
receipts of the person, partnership or corporation to whom 
the franchise is awarded, arising from its use, operation or 
possession." Each ordinance contains substantially the same 
provision. 1 Defendant filed statements and made payments 
for the years 1936-1939. which plaintiff claims were incorrect. 
Although this case is based on statements and figures for 
1939, it wi)] control all payments due from 1986 to the termi-
nation of each franchise. There is no dispute as to the 
figures in the accounting processes or what they represent 
and no dispute as to the end result for the other years once 
it is determined which of the accounting methods is correct. 
The trial court made findings and entered judgment sustain-
ing defendant's eomputations and return of the amount due. 
Plaintiff appeals. contending that the judgment is not in 
accord with section 8 of the Broughton Act as construed by , 
this court in County of Tulare v. Oity of Dinuba (1922), 188 
Cal. 664 [206 P. 983]. 
Defendant made the following computation of the amount 
due plaintiff for 1939, the year selected by the parties for 
presenting the issues: 
From its total capital, $31,216,087.18, defendant deducted 
its intangibles, $152.851.98. leaving $31,063.785.15 as its total 
investment in operative property, i. e., property used and 
useful in purchasing. producing, and distributing gas. It 
then segregated the amount invested in property not on rights 
of way, public or private. $9.955.707.06. and the amount. 
invested in facilities on all rights of way, public and private. 
$21,108.028.09. Defendant then dh'ided its total gross re-
ceipt~. $9,620,838.45. by its total investment in operative 
property. $31.063,735.15, which gave $0.309718 of gross re-
ceipts per dollar invested. The amount invested in operative 
property on a11 rights of way. public and private. $21.108,-
lOrdinance 500 (New Series) is typical. It provides: " ..• the said 
grantee and his or its successors or assigns shall, during the life of said 
franchise, pay to the county of Los Angeles .. two per cent (2%) of 
tIle gross annnal receipts of such grantee, and his or its successors or 
assigns, arising from the use, operation or possession of said franchise." 
) 
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028.09, was then multiplied by $0.309713, which gave a total 
of $6,537,430.70 as the gross receipts arising from the use 
of rights of way. Defendant then prorated this amount be-
tween public and private rights of way on a mileage basis. 
Defendant uses 3,249.225 miles of rights of way; 2,969.673 
miles thereof, or 91.3963 per cent, are public rights of way_ 
The amount of gross receipts attributable to all rights of way, 
$6.537,430.70, was then multiplied by 91.3963 per cent, the 
percentage of miles of right of way subject to franchises, 
which gave $5,974.969.77 as the amount of gross receipts 
attributable to such rights of way. Of the 2.969.673 miles 
of such rights of way, 456.829 miles or 15.3831 per cent are 
public rights of way in Los Angeles County. Multiplying 
$5,974,969.77 by 15.3831 per cent gave $919,135.57 as the 
gross receipts arising from the use of the franchises granted 
by plaintiff. Two per cent of that amount is $18,382.60, the 
charge for 1939 for the use of such franchises. 
The foregoing computations were based on the following 
principles, which defendant maintains, and which we agree 
(see City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante, p. 110 
[266 P.2d 14]), are in accord with the principles enunciated 
or implicit in the opinion of this court in the Tulare case: 
[1] 1. Defendant's gross receipts arise from all of its 
operative property, whether or not such property is located 
on rights of way, public or private, or on land owned or 
leased by it or on land owned by others. 
[2] 2. Defendant's operative property consists of various 
kinds of real and personal property, including land leased 
or owned, compressor stations and equipment, meter stations 
and equipment, regulator stations and equipment, gas pro-
duction equipment, pipe lines, valves. general office buildings, 
warehouses, transportation equipment, laboratory equipment, 
ctc. Pipe lines and appurtenances on public and private rights 
of way are but a component part of defendant's over-all 
system. 
[3] 3. Since the 2 per cent charge applies only to gross 
receipts arising from the use of the franchises. gross receipts 
arising from operative property other than franchises must 
be excluded from the base to which the 2 per cent charge 
applies. 
[4] 4. As in rate making, there is a relationship between 
the value of the property and the amount it earns; the dollars 
invested in the property produce the dollars that form the 
cross receipts. Since every dollar invested in operative prop-
) 
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erty earns an equal part of the gross receipts, gross receipts 
are attributed to a particular item or class of operative 
property according to the dollars invested in it. Moreover, 
the factors in the proration must be measured in the same 
terms, and since the gross receipts are measured in dollars, 
the property giving rise to them must be measured in dollars. 
(City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante, p. 110 
[266 P.2d 14].) Although this court's opinion in the 
Tulare case did not specify how the gross receipts were to 
be apportioned between the property on various rights of 
way and other property, the method here described is the 
only feasible method of making that apportionment and was 
used on the retrial of the Tulare case (87 Cal.App. 744, 
745-746). It is fair. practical, readily understood, and easily 
verified. 
[6] 5. Gross receipts that arise from the use of the fran-
chises are the gross receipts attributable to that part of the 
property using the public rights of way pursuant to the 
franchises. 
[6] 6. Gross receipts attributable to the various rights 
of way are apportioned between public and private rights of 
way according to mileage, "not necessarily as an exclusive 
method." but as a practicable one, as suggested in the Tulare 
case. (188 Cal. 664. 681.) Defendant could have made this· 
apportionmeTIt according to the amounts invested in rights 
of ~ai as in (4) above (City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. 
Tel. OfA'p., ante, pp. 110, 122, 125-126 [266 P.2d 14]). 
but plaintiff raises no question as to this method of appor-
tioning gross receipts between rights of way and. in fact, adopts 
it in its own computations. 
[7] Plaintiff contends that in arriving at the base to which 
the 2 per cent charge applies, defendant and the trial court 
erred in deducting all gross receipts attributable to (1) its 
office and other general facilities; (2) the part of its distribu-
tion system on private property owned by consumers and' 
not under lease by defendant; (3) the part of its distribution 
system on private property owned or leased by defendant. 
Since this contention would not permit the allocation of 
any of defendant's gross receipts to the foregoing classes 
of property, it necessarily involves a repudiation of the 
principle that defendant's gross receipts arise from all of its 
operative property and that gross receipts arising from all 
operative property other than franchises mnst be excluded 
from the base on which the 2 per cent charge is computed. 
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Plaintiff would justify this repudiation on the grounds that 
the Tulare case decided that the total gross receipts of a public 
utility can only be divided into two categories: (1) that which 
is credited to its distribution system and (2) that which is 
credited to its production system; that the gross receipts 
attributable to its distribution system constitutes the fund 
from which the 2 per cent charge shall be ascertained; that 
the only gross receipts of defendant from its operative prop-
erty that can be attributed to its production system and there-
fore excluded from the fund from which the 2 per cent charge 
is ascertained is the $134,111.96 investment in facilities for 
manufacturing the small amount of gas it produces and does 
not buy from others; and that the only gross receipts of 
defendant attributable to its distribution system that are not 
subject to the 2 per cent charge are the gross receipts attrib-
utable to the use of private rights of way. In support of 
this contention, plaintiff cites the following language from 
the Tulare case: 
"The gross receipts of this defendant accrue from two 
distinct agencies. One is the generating plants or power-
houses of the company, located in three separate counties; 
the other is the distributing system .... The first step in 
this accounting should be to determine as a question of fact 
what proportion of the total annual gross receipts of the 
public utility should be justly credited to its distribution 
system over various rights of way, as distinguished from 
its power plants or other producing agencies." (188 Cal. 
673,681.) 
This language, however, must be read in the light of the 
conclusions this court had reached as a basis for the steps 
in the accounting. Among these conclusions were: "The 
corporation's gross receipts, to refer to the language of the 
Act arise from the 'use, operation or possession' not alone 
of these franchises over the streets and highways, but like-
wise from the use, operation, or possession of the power-
houses and private rights of way. The two last named are 
not subject to any franchise charges and the county or 
municipality is not entitled under the law to any part of 
the gross receipts attributable to these privately owned parts 
of the system." (188 Cal. 673-674.) It should be noted that 
the reason for the conclusion that the county or municipality 
was not entitled to any part of the gross receipts attributable 
to powerhouses and priYate rights of way, was that the com-
pany's gross receipts arise, not alone from the "use ••• n 
) 
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of the franchise, but from the use of powerhouses and private 
rights of way, which are not subject to any franchise charges. 
[8] It is clear from the opinion in the Tulare case that the 
principle that this court there enunciated was that the county 
was not entitled to any part of the gross receipts from utility 
property not subject to franchise charges. The gross receipts 
attributable to generating plants, powerhouses, and private 
rights of way were excluded, not because the court regarded 
them as the only source of gross receipts other than the use 
of franchises, but because they were privately owned parts 
of the system not subject to any franchise charges. (See, 
also, City of San Diego v. Southcl'n Cal. Tel. Corp., ante; City 
of Monrovia v. Southern Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.App. 659 
[296 P. 117]; Ocean Park Pier Am:usement Corp. v. Santa 
Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d 76 [104 P.2d 668, 879].) Since 
that reason applies with equal force to all operative property 
of the company not subject to any franchise charges, it cannot 
reasonably be implied that this court meant that only oper-
ative property of the kind mentioned contributes to gross 
receipts. That such an implication is absurd is apparent 
from the statement, "The absurdity of the position that any 
integral part of an electric distributing system like this is 
entitled to credit for the whole of the earnings from deliveries 
and sales in a given county or municipality when a large 
part of such service is over parts of the system not subject 
to such franchise permit may be shown by various illustra- ! 
tions." (188 Cal. 674.) [9] Operative property other than 
generating plants. powerhouses. and the distributing system 
consisting of poles and wires, are just as much an integral 
part of an electric or gas system as generating plants, power-
houses and private rights of way. Office buildings to house 
engineers and executive and administrative staff, warehouses, 
transportation equipment, communication equipment, meter 
devices, laboratory equipment and other facilities are all. 
essential to an electric or gas company's operations and all 
contribute to its gross receipts. If it is absurd to say that 
any integral yart of such a system is entitled to credit for 
the whole of its gross receipts. it is equally absurd to say 
that any number less than the whole is so entitled. 
Plaintiff's contention is based on the erroneous conclU-
sion that in the Tulare case this court regarded all prop-
erty of a public utility other than generating plants ana 
powerhouses as part of its distribnting system. Thjs court 
was there concerned, not with labels or a division of the 
) 
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property into producing system and distributing system, but 
with property that was and property that was not subject 
to any franchise charge. The arbitrary classification of land, 
office buildings, warehouses. garages, construction equipment, 
automotive equipment, laboratory and other equipment as 
entirely part of the distribution system rather than as part 
of the production system or as part of both production and 
distribution systems or as "other [revenue] producing agen-
cies" (188 Cal. 664, 681), would not only be unreasonable 
but pointless. [10] Even if all of the property other than 
generating plants and powerhouses could reasonably be re-
garded as entirely part of the utility's distribution system, it 
would not follow that gross receipts attributable thereto should 
be included in the fund to which the 2 per cent charge applies. 
Thus, property in private rights of way is admittedly part 
of the distribution system. Yet this court in the Tulare case 
made it abundantly clear that gross receipts attributable to 
such property were not subject to the 2 per cent charge, 
since such property was "not subject to any franchise 
charges." For the same reason gross receipts from any 
other parts of the dbtribution system that are not subject 
to franchise charges are not subject to the 2 per cent charge. 
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the capital investment 
method as suo h for allocating gross receipts to a particular 
item or class of operative property in it. In fact, it uses 
that method itself in its own apportionment between produc-
tion and distribution. Plaintiff contends that although this 
method is "plausible" and "entirely correct," there is no 
occasion to use it as defendant uses it and that unless it is 
limited to the use plaintiff makes of it to apportion gross 
receipts between production and distribution. defendant will 
get a double deduction for the same purpose: (1) the deduc-
tion taken by the proration on a mileage basis for gross re-
ceipts attributable to private rights of way and (2) the deduc-
tion taken, before the proration on a mileage basis, for oper-
ative property not located on rights of way. This contention 
assumes the validity of the distinction, discussed at length 
above. that plaintiff would make between production and dis-
tribution and the conclusions it would draw therefrom, and 
is simply another way of asserting that only gross receip.ts 
attributable to generating plants and private rights of way 
can h" C':;:('1uiled from the base to which the 2 per cent charge 
applies. There is no double deduction for the same purpose. 
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[11] Gross receipts attributable to private rights of way and 
gross receipts attributable to private property not located on 
rights of way are separately excluded from the base to which 
the 2 per cent charge applies, without duplication or over-
lapping, and for the same reason-they arise from property 
not subject to any franchise charges. 
[12] Plaintiff would also justify its repudiation of the 
principle that defendant's gross receipts arise from all of 
its operative property and that gross receipts arising from 
all operative property other than franchises must be excluded 
from the base on which the 2 per cent charge is computed, 
on the following theory: The Broughton Act allows the 
utility to retain 98 per cent of its total gross receipts as the percentage applicable to its private property and requires 
it to pay to cities and counties 2 per cent of its gross receipts 
(less those attributable to private rights of way) for the use 
of public property; if it were allowed to take any more of 
its gross receipts as applicable to its private property, it 
would get a double deduction: (1) the amount so taken and 
(2) the 98 per cent it is allowed to retain. This theory 
ignores the limitation in the Broughton Act that the 2 per 
cent charge applies, not to defendant's total gross receipts, 
but only to its gross receipts "arising from the use" of the 
franchise. Thus, by its express terms the Broughton Act 
allows the utility to retain not only 98 per cent but 100 per 
cent of its gross receipts from its private property not subject 
to franchise charges, as well as 98 per cent of its gross receipts 
arising from the use of the franchises. It is not 2 per cent 
of its total gross receipts but only 2 per cent of its gross 
receipts "arising from the use" of the franchises that is 
exacted as a payment for the use of such franchises. The 
foregoing theory of plaintiff's is simply a slight modification, 
purportedly made in obedience to the Tulare case, of another 
contention suggested by it that the Tulare case should be 
disregarded and that there should be only a proration of 
the entire gross receipts between rights of way on a miieage 
basis.2 As we have pointed out at some length above, and 
8Jn advancing this contention plaintiff makes the specious argument 
that gross receipts means all receipts without deduction and that there 
is no more justification for deducting a cent from gross receipts than 
there would be to deduct manufacturing costs from the retail priee of 
gas appliances in computing a sales tax based on gross receipts. There 
is no deduction here of manufacturing costs, cost of gas, costs of opera-
tion or other costs. Gross receipts that are attributed to the nse of 
franchises and to other operative property are still gross receipts. There 
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in City of San Diego v. So-uthern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante, 
pp. 110, 124 [266 P.2d 14], that is not what the statute pro-
vides. There is no more justification for prorating the total 
gross receipts between rights of way than there would be for 
attributing the total gross receipts to each franchise used 
u.J requiring the utility to pay 2 per cent of its total gross 
receipts to each of the numerous cities and counties granting 
the franchises. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It appears to me that the gas company formula, accepted 
by the majority, attempts to deduct every possible dollar of 
inyested capital from the distribution system before they 
compute the value of the distribution system attributable 
to either public or private ways. In this manner they seek 
to base the county's share on little more than pipe in tM 
ground. This is a complete misconception of the Broughton 
Act and its interpretation by this court in the Dinuba case. 
(Clfflnty of Tulare v. City of Dimtba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 P. 
983] .) 
The Broughton Act provides that the utility "shall during 
the life of the franchise pay to the county or municipality 
two percent (2%) of the gross annual receipts of the grantee 
arising from the use, operation, or possession of the fran-
chise." In giving an interpretation to the meaning of these 
words this court, in the Dinuba case, supra, stated (p. 673) 
that the corporation's gross receipts "arise from the 'use, 
operation or possession,' not alone of these franchises over 
the streets and highways, but likewise from the use, opera-
tion, or possession of the power-houses and private rights 
of way. The two last named are not subject to any franchise 
charges and the county or municipality is not entitled under 
the law to any part of the gross receipts attributable to these 
ia no deduction from gross receipts but a proration of gross receipts 
between property that is subject to franchise charges and property that 
is not, just as there is no deduction from gross receipts in plaintiff's 
proration of gross reeeipts between rights of way. Plaintiff's argument 
would neeessarily lead to the conclusion that there ean be no proration 
of gross receipts, even between rights of way, and that for every fraD.-
chise granted by each county and city, defendant must pay 2 per cent 
of its total gross receipts. 
) 
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privately owned parts of the system." This court then went 
on to say (p. 681) that "The first step in this accounting 
should be to determine as a question of fact what proportion 
of the total amount of gross receipts of the public utility 
should be justly accred1:ted to its distnouNng system over 
various rights of way, as distinguished from its power plants 
or other produc1"ng agencies. 
"This will establish the fund from which the percentage 
of earnings 'arising from the use, operation or possession' 
of the various franchise easements shall be ascertained. 
"The percentage of this fund to be apportioned to the 
respective public franchises will not include the proportion 
of such gross receipts of the distributing system as are at-
tributable to the use of private rights of way occupied by 
the utility, as such part of the system is not subject to 
franchise charge." (Emphasis added.) 
The clear import of this language is that we are first to 
deduct from gross revenue that amount attributable to the 
production system. This leaves us with the amount of gross 
revenue attributable to the entire distribution system. We 
then must determine what proportion of these earnings of 
the entire distribution system to attribute to the distribution 
system on public ways as contrasted to the distribution system 
located on private ways. Such was clearly this court's view 
in the Dinuba case when it said (p. 676): "The reasonable 
construction of the language used is that each county or 
municipality is entitled to its percentage of the gross earn-
ings arising from the use of its highway, in the proportion 
that the receipts arising from the use of such highways bears 
to the receipts attributable to all the rights of way of the 
entire system." In determining what share of the distribu-
tion earnings to attribute to the public ways and what share 
to the private ways this court felt that the relative mileage 
, of each was the most appropriate basis. This was illustrated 
by the following statement on page 681: "We have adopted 
this appropriation, to the various rights of way, according 
to mileage, not necessarily as an exclusive method of distri-
butiun of the gross receipts, but as a practicable one where 
the contribution of the variotls franchise easements to the 
gross earnings cannot be otherwise determined . ... There 
may be instances wIlere the extent or value of the distributing 
system over a given right of way may indicate its earning 
capacity; or where the s(>rvice of lat<:>ral 1i.nes may b", differ-
entiated from that of main conduits in the value of their use 
) 
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of the easements. In such cases these conditions should be 
taken into account. But where, as will often happen, con-
tribution to the earnings of the various rights of way is gen-
eral and indistinguishable, we can see no reason why the 
proportionate mileage basis should not be used in apportioning 
the statutory percentage of gross receipts." (Emphasis 
added.) 
'Thus we see that once we have determined what proportion 
of the gross receipts is attributable to the entire distribution 
system, we must find some method of determining what 
proportion is attributable to private ways and what portion 
is attributable to public ways. The most practical method 
of so doing is by use of the relative mileage basis. An example 
of its application was given by this court in the Dinuba case 
(p. 676) where it said: "I t may be assumed that the dis-
tributing system covers six hundred miles of easements. The 
proportion of the gross receipts derived from and chargeable 
to the use of the distrt'buting system should be credited to 
tltu entire mileage. One-third of this mileage may extend 
over private rights of way which are not subject to any 
franchise liability. The remaining two-thirds of the mileage 
to\'ered by county franchises is entitled to two-thirds of the 
two per cent of the gross amount, and each county is entitled 
to the percentage of this two-thirds in the proportion that 
the mileage of its franchises bears to the total mileage covered 
by all the franchises." (Emphasis added.) 
By its language this court, in the Dinuba case, made it 
txtremely clear that the 2 per cent was to be taken from that 
portion of the gross receipts of the total distribution system 
attributable to the distribution system on public ways; that 
the exact earnings of each mile in the system cannot always 
be accurately determined; that the value of each portion of 
the distribution system is not necessarily indicative of its 
farning capacity and therefore the best method of prorating 
the earnings of the entire distribution system between public 
and private ways is to use the mileage basis. All of this 
makes it apparent that this court established a rather simple 
formula whereby we first determine what portion of the total 
gross receipts is attributable to the distribution system, and 
then, as the best practical method of prorating these total 
distribution receipts between public and private ways, we use 
the relative mileage basis. From the gross receipts attrib-
utable to public ways the governmental bodies granting the 
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franchises are entitled to 2 per cent of· tbeir proportionate 
interest. What could be clearer? 
As stated by the District Court of Appeal in its opinion 
in this case (see County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cou1lties 
Gat; Co., (Cal.App.), 259 P.2d 665): "The Broughton 
Act recognized the justice of allowing a public utility a 
credit for its private property by exempting 98 per cent of 
the gross receipts from the franchise charge. The Dinuba 
case went a step further in allowing an apportionment of 
the 2 per cent toll so as to eliminate any charge for that 
proportion of the mileage over private rights of way. The 
gas company is not satisfied to accept the benefits granted 
by both the Broughton Act and the Dinuba decision, but 
in addition thereto it takes the additional deduction for thc 
facilities located on private property by the utilization of 
the so-called 'capital investment method' of accounting." 
The formula proposed by the county and accepted by the 
District Court of Appeal follows the pattern as established 
in the Dinuba case. The gas company, on the other hand, 
seeks to use a combination formula which includes some of 
the suggestions of the Dinuba case but which also includes 
several other calculations designed to reduce to a bare mini-
mum the amount due the county. For a clearer understand-
ing of the gas company's departure from the formula in the 
Dinuba case, it may be well at this time to compare the 
methods used by the county and by the gas company. 
To begin with it should be noted that both the county and 
the gas company are in accord as to certain calculations even 
though they are made at different stages of the respective 
formulae. As a starting point both the county and gas 
company agree that in 1939 total invested capital equalled 
$31,216,081.13. From this both deduct intangibles, capital in 
general facilities and office and capital invested in production 
facilities. This leaves a total of $28,548,380.17 as that portion 
of the total capital which is invested in the distribution 
system. Once the extent of the distribution system, as con-
trasted to the producing system, has been ascertained, the 
next step should (under the Dinuba case) be to' determine 
what proportion of the gross receipts can be attributed to 
the total distribution system. This is required under the· 
Dinuba formula and is done by the county. Thus the county 
calcul~t('s that the amount of capital invested in distribution 
is 99.1306 per cent as contrastrd to .R694 per cent invested 
in production facilities. Since 99.1306 per cent of the pr~ 
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tluction and distribution capital is invested in distribution 
facilities it follows that 99.1306 per cent of the gross receipts 
should be credited to the entire distribution system. This is 
the logical approach, this is the reasoning of the Dinuba case 
and this is the formula used by the county, but the gas 
company seeks still another deduction. Rather than deter-
mine the amount of capital invested in the entire distribu-
tion system they seek a figure which includes only the dis-
tribution capital invested in rights of way. To do this they 
. deduct $7,556,603.15, which is the value of all distribution 
capital on consumer's property or on leased property. It is 
in this major respect that the gas company formula departs 
from the Dinuba case and differs from the county formula. 
By so doing the gas company deducts over 25 per cent of 
the value of the entire distribution system before computing 
the gross receipts attributable to the distribution system. This 
leaves only the capital invested in rights of way and has the 
effect of basing the gross receipts attributable to the distribu-
tion system on little more than the value of the pipe in the 
ground. It is a departure from the strict mileage formula 
established by the decision in the Dinuba case. 
The net result of the gas company formula is that it does 
not compute the gross receipts for the entire distribution 
system as required by the Dinuba case, but it tries to limit 
the fund to those receipts attributable only to rights of way. 
It attempts to exclude some of the distribution system which 
is located on private property in this preliminary calculation, 
when such exclusion should properly be made only on the 
mileage basis when the ratio of public to private system is 
determined. 
As has already been pointed out in the Dinuba case the 
value of an isolated portion of the distributing system is not 
necessarily indicative of its earning capacity. Certain por-
tions which are new may have a greater value but far less 
earning capacity than some of the older sections which have 
little book value but a great deal of earning power. The 
terminus of a gas conduit may be one of the most extensive 
parts of the line but that does not mean that the meters and 
terminal equipment account for most all the earnings and 
that the transporting conduit earns little or nothing. Thus 
we can see that while the amount of capital invested in an 
entire system may be some indication of its earnings, we 
cannot segregate isolated portions of a system and determine 
that its dollar value is a correct measurement of its earning 
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power. For this reason this court in the Dinuba case pre-
ferred to compute al1 the gross receipts attributable to the 
entire distribution system and then prorate them between 
the public and private ways on a mileage basis rather than 
deducting part of such system on a dollar value basis. This 
is necessary since as a practical matter the contributions of 
the various portions of the distribution system to the gross 
distribution receipts cannot otherwise be determined. 
The majority fails to recognize the fact that some portions 
of the distribution system which are low in dollar value may 
have an earning power as great or greater than other portions 
which have a high book value. Based on this misconception 
it states that "As in rate making there is a relationship 
between the value of the property and the amount it earns; 
the dollars invested in the property produce the dollars that 
form the gross receipts. Since every dollar invested in opera-
tive property earns an equal part of the gross receipts, gross 
receipts are attributed to a particular item or class of opera-
tive property according to the dollars invested in it." Granted 
that there is a relationship between the value of 8 corpora-
tion's property and the amount it earns. we must recognize 
the limitations of such a broad generalization. Thus it might 
be said that there is a relationship between the value of the 
entire production system- and the extent of its earning power; 
or it might be said that there is a relationship between the 
value of the entire distribution system and the amount it 
earns; but such a general relationship between the value of 
the property and the degree of earning power cannot be 
carried too far. For example. assume that every building 
on Block «, A" has a direct conduit connection with the main 
gas line: that each conduit has a book value of $100: that 
one of the buildings serviced is a restaurant using gas ranges; 
that one of the buildings is a bakery using gas ovens; that 
two of the buildings are unoccupied: that one of the buildings 
is occupied by a frozen food locker; and that one of the 
buildings is occupied by a meat market. From this type of 
factual situation it can clearly be seen that the amount of 
gas consumed by the various customers serviced 'will vary to 
a considerable extent even though the value of the conduit 
into each building has the same $100 book value. Thus we 
see that the earning power of the various conduits will vary 
in spite of the fact that the same number of dollars is invested 
in each: and therefore the generalization that earnings have 
a relationship to dollars invested bas its limitations. 
) 
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Granting that there is a relationship between the dollars 
invested in an entire system and its earnings, there is not 
always an accurate relationship between the value of a par-
ticular portion of the system and its earnings. In view of 
this it is not correct to say (as the majority has) that "every 
doUar invested in operative property earns an equal part 
of the gross receipts," and that" gross receipts are attributed 
to a particula,. item or class of operative property according 
to the dollars invested in it." (Emphasis added.) By this 
reasoning the majority (following the theory advanced by 
the gas company) contends that the earning power of the 
public ways must be limited to the actual value of the invest-
ments in rights of ways after various other portions of the 
distribution system have been deducted. Thus they compute 
the dollars earned on a particula.r portion of the distribution 
system on a dollar investment basis even though such a method 
is only feasible when applied to an entire system as contrasted 
to an isolated part. 
These limitations were recognized by this court in the 
Dinuba case when it stated (p. 682): "There may be in-
stances where the extent or value of the distributing system 
over a given right of way may indicate its earning capacity; 
• • . But where, as will often happen, contribution to the 
earnings of the various rights of way is general and indis-
tinguishable, we can see no reason why the proportionate 
mileage basis should not be used in apportioning the statutory 
percentage of gross receipts." Thus in order to compute 
the gross receipts arising from the use, operation or possession 
of the public franchise we must first determine the gross 
receipts of the entire distribution system and then on a mileage 
basis prorate these gross receipts between public and private 
ways. 
By seeking to deduct the $7,556,603.15 as part of the dis-
tribution system on consumers' property or on leased property 
and later seeking to deduct 8.603 per cent of the mileage 
as being located on private ways the gas company is attempt-
ing a form of double deduction. The portion of the distribu-
tion system located at the terminus of each line is high in 
value ($7,556,603.15) but low in mileage so the gas company 
seeks to deduct this portion on a dollar basis. The other 
portions of the distribution system on private ways do not 
account for as much value (approximately $2,400,000) so 
the gas company is willing to compute these portions on a 
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mileage basis. Thus the gas company attempts to divide 
the distribution system on priYate ways into two parts. The 
one part having a high value ($7,556,603.15) they seek to 
deduct on a dollar basis. The other portions having a lower 
dollar value (approximately $2,400,000) but a higher mileage 
value they seek to deduct on a mileage basis. Actually the 
gas company is only entitled to one deduction from the re-
ceipts of the distribution system and that is a single deduction 
for the proportion of the distribution system on private ways. 
This should include that portion of the system running over 
private ways owned by the company: private ways leased by 
the company, private ways merely used by the company 
and all other forms of private ways including the conduits 
and equipment running to each consumer. Why should there 
be a distinction between private ways on consumers' prop-
erty and other private ways' It is all part of the distribution 
system and the gas company will be credited with that portion 
of the distribution system on all private ways on a mileage 
basis. 
By these calculations the gas company has reduced the 
total of distribution receipts to $6,537,430.70 rather than the 
total of $9,537,137.16 reached under the county formula. 
Since 91.3963 per cent of the distribution mileage is on public 
ways the gross receipts fund attributable to public ways, 
from which the 2 per cent is to be taken, should total 
$8,716,590.49 instead of $5,974,969.77 as computed by the 
company. The net result of the gas company's double deduc-
tion is that for 1939 the county of Los Angeles having 15.3831 
per cent of the public ways would only be entitled to 
$18,382.60 rather than $26,817.63. 
There can be no doubt that the Broughton Act as well 
as the Dinuba case intended the 2 per cent to be taken from 
the gross receipts attributable to the distribution system after 
the proportion attributable to priYate ways had been deducted.. 
However, the manner of deducting or excluding such items 
must be consistent. It is not proper to exclude the part of 
the distribution system located on private property on a 
dollar invested basis and the balance on a mileage basis. 
The term gross receipts was adequately defined by the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal (County of Los Angeles v. Southern 
Cownt1'es Gas Co., (Cal.App.) 259 P.2d 665) when it said: 
"No authority has been fonnd to define the term 'gross re-
ceipts' to mean anything othrr than the total without deduc-
tion; it means 'all receipts on business beginning and ending 
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within this state.' (Pacific Gas &- Elec. Co. v. Roberts, 176 
Cal. 183, 189 [167 P. 845].) The phrase is 'plain language 
which requires no interpretation - .. "perfectly plain, un-
equivocal language" ... it must be taken in its plain sense 
without limitation or deduction save as expressly modi-
fied by the Legislature.' (Bekins Van Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 
21 Cal. 2d 135, 140 [130 P.2d 421].) Gross receipts mean all 
receipts arising from or growing out of the employment of 
the corporation's capital in its designated business. (Robert-
. ~~n v. Johnson, 55 Cal.App.2d 610 [131 P.2d 388].) Is there 
any doubt then that the Legislature intended for the utility 
to pay as a toll for the use of public highways on which to 
lay its pipes, tracks or cables, 2 per cent of its gross receipts' 
"These conclusions are fortified by the doctrine of strict 
eonstruction. The basic franchise ordinance (No. 1107. New 
Series, 1924) provides that 'the franchise is granted upon each 
and every condition contained herein, and in the ordinance 
granting the same and shall ever be strictly construed against 
the grantee.' When a franchise provides for the protection 
of the public interest, it is a fair assumption that the board 
of supervisors endeavored to perform its duty as trustee 
for the public and that the provisions were inserted for the -
purpose of securing for the public all substantial advantages. 
(38 Am.Jur. 214.) It is a general principle of construction 
that franchises granted by the state to private persons or cor-
porations must be construed most strongly in favor of the pub-
lic. If a doubt arises, nothing is to be taken by implication 
as against public rights. (Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 160 
Cal. 30, 38 [116 P. 722] ; Sacramento v. Pa~rfic Gas ~ Elec. 
Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978].) 
"From all that is said above it is unavoidable that the 
franchise must be construed strictly in favor of the county 
and as so construed respondent should pay its full 2 per 
cent of its gross receipts each year of the life of its franchise 
with no deductions except those attributable to production 
capital and the proportion of the distribution system belonging 
to the utility." 
It would also appear that the cases cited by the majority 
and the gas company were adequately distinguished by the 
District Court of Appeal (County of Los Angeles v. Southern 
Counties Gas Co., supra, (Cal.App.) 259 P.2d 665) in the 
following discussion: "Ocean Park Pier Amusement Corp. v. 
City of Santa Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d 76 [104 P.2d 668, 879], 
J 
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cited by the gas company in support of its position, is readily 
distinguishable. In that case the city exacted the full statu-
tory toll for the use of its own property and in addition 
sought to exact a charge for the use of the corporation's prop-
erty. It was therefore properly held that no franchise pay-
ment need be made for the use of private property with re-
spect to which no public property was contributed or used. 
In the case at bar, however, the gas company has consistently 
utilized public property in its operations and of course could 
Dot operate for an instant without public franchises, but the 
record discloses no attempt by appellant 'to include in the 
grant, land over which it had no proprietary interest,' as was 
true of the City of Santa Monica in the last cited authority, 
page 86. 
"Respondent cites also Oity Of Monrovia v. Southern 
Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.App. 659 [296 P. 117], as authority 
for its contention. The court said at page 660, 'In accord-
ance with this method [from the Dinuba decision] the de-
fendant . . . [eliminated] that portion of its earnings attrib-
utable to the use of its properties located on private property.' 
The context of the above sentence, a portion of which re-· 
spondent quotes, makes it clear that the mileage allocation ·1 
formula of the Dinuba decision, under no dispute in the 
instant case, is referred to. But in any event, the only issue 
involved in the Monrovia action was whether or not the city 
was entitled to 2 per cent of the gross receipts collected within 
the city, a point not at all involved in the instant controversy." 
If we are to abide by the decision of the Dinuba case, 
if we are to insist on a fair and consistent formula without 
double deductions, and if we are to construe the franchise 
most strongly in favor of the public (as is required by law), 
then we must reverse the judgment rendered by the trial 
court. 
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant'a peti~on for a rehearing was denied February .. 
17, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
